While European countries have been very generous by opening their frontiers to trade, investing in transition countries, and accepting as EU new members some of the latter, their migration policies were less liberal. The policy coherence debate is an old theme in the international economics literature, which is revisited here by looking at the relationships between aid and migration policies towards new member states. Are they substitutes or complements? What happens if eastern European labour markets conditions improve? In theory, potential migrants will stay home, and the concern of being invaded by skilled/unskilled workers searching for better conditions and higher wages in the old member states can be alleviated. But in practice, at low level or revenue in the origin countries, economic progress can result in lowering a budgetary constraint (potential migrants cannot afford the cost of moving), leading to more migration pressures. We therefore compute the critical level of GDP, above which an increase in European transfers and improvement in economic situation of the recipient country will not lead to an increase in migration pressures by decreasing the cost of moving. It amounts to 2837 $US for within European migration. We argue that this critical level is not the same for a skilled and for an unskilled individual. In other words, the critical revenue, under which a skilled individual with better opportunities abroad decides to migrate, will be higher than the critical revenue for an unskilled worker, who may be better off by staying home and looking for a job at home: US$15085 for the former, and US$ 4384 for the latter. This has an important implication, namely that in some cases, increasing financial transfers will result in increasing the gap between skilled and unskilled departures from countries suffering already from a brain drain phenomena.
Introduction
Considerable progress in the re-unification process between Western and Eastern Europe has been achieved over the last fifteen years. This progress is the result of different factors, trade and financial opening, particularly with the EU, reforms, privatisation, and stabilisation. For the countries, which eventually entered the EU, the implementation of the European set of rules like democracy, the rule of law, the respect of the minorities, and the Acquis Communautaire, has played a key role in attracting investors, implementing a strong and reliable business environment, and enforcing confidence in the emerging markets. Last but not least, important amounts of financial aid have been provided to the countries, which wanted either to join the EU or to participate to the creation of a large European area and "high-quality" neighbouring. The last chapter of the European reconstruction which followed the fall of the Berlin wall has been the complete opening of the borders for individuals. The free movement of persons is currently under progress and is likely to constitute the very last step in the process of European re-integration.
Can we think of a sort of rationale behind this apparent non-consistency of the European policies towards Eastern European countries, being very liberal in the extent of trade and financial opening, generous in terms of the financial/technical assistance provided to those countries, but at the same showing some inconsistency by closing the EU's frontiers to the immigration of Eastern Europeans? Relying upon the seminal work of Schiff (2006) , this paper will try to answer the question. We present in section 1 objectives of the study, in section 2 the stylised facts, in section 3 the data, methodology, and results. In section 4 we extend the analysis of the migration/aid relationships by taking into account the skilled versus unskilled nature of the migrants coming to Western Europe. Conclusion summarizes.
Objectives of this study
The policy coherence debate is an old theme in the international economics literature since the seminal work of Mundell (1957) . In principle trade and migration are substitute, implying that opening trade dampens the migration pressures, but they can be complementary 1 .
What about aid and migration policies? Are they substitutes or complements, particularly in Europe? "Substitute" means that by improving the conditions on the local labour markets (local wages, better perspectives over the long run), the incentives for emigrating become lower, and the concern of being invaded by skilled/unskilled workers searching for better conditions and higher wages can be alleviated. "Complement" means that at low level of revenue and when potential migrants cannot afford the cost of moving because of a liquidity constraint, economic progress can result in lowering this liquidity constraint, leading to more migration pressures. We therefore ask the question whether improving living standard in Eastern and Central Europe might result in an increase or decrease of migration flows to the industrialized countries.
To our knowledge very few empirical papers have answered precisely these questions, but a recent work by Beuran, Berthelemy and Maurel (2008) , which analyses the aid/migration relationships by focusing on a broader range of countries.
The question is particularly relevant from a policy perspective in Europe. "Structural Fund" policies have played a key role in the catching-up process in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain in the European Union, and a similar policy is now implemented in favour of new members of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe. Our objective is to compute the critical level of GDP, above which an increase in European transfers and improvement in economic situation of the recipient country will not lead to an increase in migration pressures by decreasing the cost of moving.
In other words, we want to compute the level of GDP above which aid and migration will be consistent with each other.
1 Complementarities may exist between labour flows and trade in particular (Markusen, 1983) . Schiff (2006) provides a recent survey on recent developments in this literature.
Another key issue is the skilled content of migration flows. Recall that if trade and migration were substitutes, trade would be specialized and migration should provide EU-15 countries with unskilled workers. This does not necessarily occur for two reasons. Migration and trade are not always substitute, and the composition (skilled/unskilled) of migration does not necessarily follow the logics of specialisation.
Second migration policies tend to favour skilled migration. As a result, all categories of workers have incentives for moving to Western Europe. Whatever his education, a potential migrant will take the step if the expected migration's payoff is positive.
Our prior is that the threshold, below which the migration's payoff is positive, may not be the same for a skilled and for an unskilled individual. In other words, the critical revenue, under which a skilled individual with better opportunities abroad decides to migrate, will be higher than the critical revenue for an unskilled worker, who may be better off by staying home and looking for a job at home. This has an important implication, namely that in some cases, increasing financial transfers will result in increasing the gap between skilled and unskilled departures from countries suffering already from a brain drain phenomena.
2 The stylised facts: European trade, finance and aid
Trade and Finance
The restructuring of trade and output has been extremely fast in central and eastern
European countries (CEECs 2 ). Over the course of 15 years, the whole region has succeeded in recovering the GDP level of the pre-transition period, changing the pattern of trade into a more mature one, reaching the potential volume predicted by empirical models, and more generally being integrated with Western Europe. The most striking fact in this regard is the timeline of EU accession. The time from the date when negotiations started to the date when the fifth enlargement occurred has been extremely short, significantly shorter than those for the previous enlargements in 1973 , 1986 , and 1995 (Duchêne et al., 2004 .
This political agenda has been crucial to the emergence of conditions amenable to increase in production, to well-functioning markets indispensable for deepening the level of European re-construction, and to duty-free access to a Single Market. In order to become eligible for accession to the EU, the CEECs had to remove, albeit gradually, their barriers to trade with the EU, introduce trade-facilitating measures, and reform their customs administration, as well as make reforms to converge to the Acquis Communautaire. In addition to duty-free access to EU markets that went into effect for most industrial products, the EU launched a Pan-European cumulation project. Its objectives were twofold: harmonization of the pace of duty-removal on industrial products and regionalization of the rules of origin through a diagonal cumulation system. The European Cumulation Agreement, which went into effect on January 1, 1997, linked CEECs (excluding Croatia) and European Economic Area countries through a diagonal cumulation system allowing imports in these countries to be treated as local inputs. The shift to duty free trade in industrial products was accelerated, and a single European trading bloc was fully in place on January 1,
2002.
Taken together, these measures have contributed to the emergence of wellfunctioning service blocs and a business-friendly environment, both necessary conditions for participation in a fragmentation-induced division of labour. As reflected by the evolution of the CEECs' trade, European transition countries rapidly changed their specialisation from traditional low value-added sectors, like textiles, clothing, and agriculture, to sectors requiring more knowledge, managerial skills, and technological competencies, i.e., high value-added sectors (Freudenberg and Lemoine, 1999) . Moreover, their trading volume, especially with EU15 countries, increased dramatically (see Table 1a , Annex 1), suggesting an increasing integration of the CEECs into EU15 production networks. This evolution was driven mainly by FDI (mostly from the EU15), which were increasingly located in the CEECs (see Table 1b , Annex1). For a global assessment of the forces driving the localization of FDI in the region and driving the process of integrating these countries into EU15 production networks, see Lefilleur and Maurel (2008) .
European aid policies
In addition, the transition in CEECs benefited from an exceptional historical commitment of the EU, which opened its frontiers dramatically, invested massively, and which, after the New Member States (NMS thereafter) entry into the EU, send As can be seen from the comparison of tables 2 and 3, the European Aid goes far beyond the official development aid (ODA), in financial amounts, topics covered, and objectives pursued. But the policies are not always coherent. Certain situations in the world are characterized by inconsistencies, which are collected by the Centre for Global Development and its "Commitment to Development Index" (Roodman, 2005, see For the European case, the only inconsistency was the migration policy against potential workers from EU candidate countries (some of them became members) and European neighbours. While the former is deemed to disappear because (or thanks)
to the recent EU enlargements, the latter will continue to persist by following the general pattern.
Indeed the flows of workers have been quite limited over the period. In 1997, officially 950 000 individuals from the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) lived in the European Union, a number which accounted for only 0.2% of the total EU population. This migration, however, was unevenly spread across European Union countries: 527 000 (respectively 103 000) citizens of the CEECs lived in Germany (in Austria).
Migration seems to be therefore the less important aspect of the liberalisation process which occurred in Europe over the nineties. In Germany and Austria for instance, which share common borders with the CEECs and face the bulk of migration from Eastern neighbouring countries as suggested by the figures above, governments fear that migrants will be attracted by much higher salaries through crossing merely the borders. The labour market in EU countries suffering from high unemployment, migration would further exacerbate the problem. One concern is the perceived possible invasion of skilled workers ready to accept lower remunerations.
Other fears are stressed, like the possible abuse of existing welfare systems.
There are also concerns on the side of NMS, which face extremely high level of unemployment. Besides, as reflected in table 4, the demographic conditions are worrying, fertility rates being below the 2.1 level needed for the reproduction of the population. The dependency ratios are slightly better than in Western Europe, but they are expected to deteriorate. Some dramatic increases in emigration occurred in the early nineties, but in some cases net emigration is positive. The main fear concerns now the exodus of young and skilled nationals. European migration policies have probably been much more the reflection of the population fears than of the advice from economic and demographic studies, which predicted only a limited amount of immigration in their territories. Most countries in the EU-15 decided to implement some transitory restrictions on access to their labour markets. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain were the countries that opted to set labour limitations to the citizens of the NMS; contrarily, Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom decided against these measures for the initial period. Migration was not allowed during an initial period of two years. The restriction could then be extended for three additional years.
After these first five years, another assessment of the situation is to be undertaken, and only in cases when a serious labour-market disturbance or threat is proven, a further restraint of two years will potentially be accepted.
This implies that, at the latest, restrictions will have to be cut in 2011, and that, from relatively conservative in the past, migration policies will have to be extremely liberal in a very near future. They will have to be in coherence with all other components of the assistance, which has been and is still provided to new EU member countries.
But for what regards European neighbours which are not EU members, the situation is dramatically different, in as the general framework of tight migration policies applies.
3 Data, Methodology, Results
Data
Our main data source is a panel of flows of migrants from 187 sending countries, which are developing, emerging and transition economies, to 22 OECD member countries (the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD), over the period 1995-2005. We will consider whether these migrations are influenced by economic, geographic, demographic and cultural factors. We pay particular attention to the interaction that may exist between foreign assistance policy and migrations.
For disaggregated migration at each educational level (primary, secondary, and tertiary), we take advantage of the World Bank's recent release of an update to the global database of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty. This database consists of a 226x226 matrix of origin-destination stocks by country (see Parsons et al., 2007 , for a complete description of the database). It provides, however, only one point observation in time, for the year 2000, which restricts the quantitative research that can be performed using it. For a complete description of the sources which will be used, and the list of countries, see appendix 1.
Methodology: Equation of Migration Migration and aid: the hump-shaped pattern
According to the purely economic determinants of migration, migration should decrease linearly with the GDP per capita of the origin country. Observed migrations fit relatively well this intuition (Massey and al., 1998) , except for low levels of GDP per capita. The hump-shaped pattern hypothesis, which is recurrent in the empirical literature (Faini and Venturini, 1993 , Adams and Page, 2003 , refers to a positive correlation between GDP per capita and migration for relatively low levels of GDP per capita and to a negative correlation only for relatively higher levels of GDP per capita. We observe this pattern in our dataset (see Figure   2 ). The migration has been also explained in the literature by other factors. First a demographic factor (Hatton and Williamson, 1994) : poorest countries are also youngest and young adults are more likely to migrate than old adults. Second an industrialization factor: rural population is reputed to be more reluctant to international migration (according to Hatton and Williamson, 2002 , page 11, this effect is weak). Faini and Venturini (1993) We could assume that aid influences migration indirectly through its impact on income, as suggested by Faini and Venturini (1993) . However, the literature on aid effectiveness in promoting growth would not support such an assumption. This literature points rather to the disappointing conclusion that the direct effect of aid on growth is not robust at best (a quantitative summary of this literature is provided in a meta analysis run by Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2005) . We assume instead that by augmenting the available revenue of the recipient country, an increase in total aid might result in a lower budgetary constraint and more possibility for migration. For the poorest transition countries 3 , any increase in income is likely to rise rather than decreases migration.
The gravity model of international migration
According to Sjaastad (1962) and Borjas (1989 Borjas ( , 1994 , migration can be viewed as an investment in human capital. Migrants chose the destination, where their expected payoff is higher than that of any other alternative, including home wage. Several predictions can be done from the investment in human capital approach: emigration is higher (lower) the greater the mean income in the host (source) country; it is lower the greater the level of migration costs; it is higher the greater the payoff to the observed variables in the host country relative to the payoff in the host country.
Based upon the human capital approach, the gravity model of international migration is commonly used for quantifying the potential of migration (Karemera and al. (2000) and Rotte and Vogler (1999) for instance). Hönekopp (1999) in a literature survey mentioned 10 studies on East-West migration based on gravity estimates. According to him estimates of the migration potential in these studies vary between 41 000 and 680 000 annually. Those figures are not far away from the picture, which emerges from the OECD statistics in tables 7a to 7c below.
Migration depends upon supply or push factors in the sending country, and it depends also on demand or pull factors in the receiving country. Push factors are the GDP per capita differential, the GDP per capita and the squared GDP per capita of the sending country for taking into account the liquidity constraint which can be an obstacle to a migration decision. Pull factor is essentially the GDP per capita of the host country. To those basic variables we add a trade intensity variable, measured by bilateral export from country of emigration to country of immigration, as a ratio of GDP of the country of emigration; a positive parameter would imply that labour flows and external trade are complements (pull factor), while a negative parameter would imply that there are substitutes (push factor).
We depart therefore from the following system of supply and demand equations: Bilateral distance between the sending and the receiving country. This variable is a proxy for the costs related to migration: the direct expenditures for paying the transport, income losses during the migration, psychological costs due to separation from relatives, which can be assumed to be bigger if the distance is high. The latter is also a proxy for the distance between two fundamentally different social orders (the former communist society and the market, although those differences are vanishing very fast over the transition period) and for the uncertainty that those differences generate. Potential unemployment, potentially hostile attitudes of the host countries towards immigrants, the fact that human capital is not always transferable, all those factors together make migration a risky business.
Dummy variables representing historical ties: a "former colony" dummy equal to 1 when countries i and j have had in the past a colonial relation and equal to zero otherwise; a dummy for common language. We also further test whether some postcolonial ties are more influential than others (e.g. within the Commonwealth or British
Empire, labour mobility is easier than between France and former French colonies).
Those dummies are not active for Central and Eastern Europe however.
Dummy variables that take account that "western offshoots" have more immigrants than the "old" Europe; the strong link between United States and Latin America; and the cultural specificity of Japan, which has very restrictive attitudes vis-à-vis immigration.
There is a standard technical problem here, related to the censored nature of the dependent variable, which cannot be negative. Estimating such equations with all observations would result in potentially large biases. This problem is frequently treated by estimating equations on samples restricted to strictly positive variables.
This permits also to specify equations in logarithmic form, which facilitates interpretation of parameters as elasticities. We will adopt this logarithmic specification form here. This method may result however in a second bias -known as the selection bias -, which results from the fact that the selection of a country as a destination of migration may depend on variables that also influence the number of migrants. There is no perfect solution to this problem, in absence of variables that would explain the selection of a country, but not the number of migrants, that it receives. The most frequent approach is to assume that the selection bias is of second order, and we will adopt this approach.
Results: migration and aid, complement or substitute?
In Table 5 we present the results for the migration equation. The coefficients have the expected signs: positive for the difference in GDP per capita, suggesting that richer countries attract more migrants and that migration is determined by the income differential, positive for the sending country GDP per capita and negative for its squared GDP per capita. We interpret those latter results as confirming the humpshaped pattern of migration. For low level of revenue, an increase in GDP per capita results in more migration instead of less. Note: ***(resp. **, *) significant at 1 percent (resp. 5 percent, 10 percent). Student-t between brackets.
As expected, migration is a decreasing function of the physical distance. Sharing a common language or a common colonial past with the host country has a positive influence on migration flows. Trade intensity as measured by the ratio of export of the origin country on its GDP is significant and positive, suggesting that migration and trade are more complement than substitute. However, the level of significance of this latter variable is not very high and it should be considered only as a moderately significant determinant of migration flows. Time dummies are introduced here only for the sake of taking into account a possible trend in migration flows. Parameters attached to these time dummies are significant, at least partially, but do not exhibit any clear dynamic pattern.
The presence of the squared GDP per capita of the sending country allows taking into account that citizens in the poorest countries do not migrate to the industrialized world as much as a simple theory of push and pull determinants would imply. We find the inverted-U shape relationship between living standards in the third world and migration, as expected. Using the coefficients in table 5 above, we find that migration increases with incomes up to a critical revenue value equal to US$ 6084. Of course, at the policymaking level, a case-by-case discussion will be necessary.
This threshold is higher that the threshold reported in Adams and
Emigration from relatively poor countries such as Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, or Moldova may be positively influenced by taking initial steps toward development of their economies. Such migrations are, however, dampened by the distance of these countries from Western Europe. Conversely, emigration from relatively rich countries may be slowed by further development of their economies. This is particularly the case for all twelve new members of the European Union, whose GDP per capita is close to US$6084. According to table 6, only one country, Slovenia, which is the richest amongst transition European countries, would face a decrease in migration outflows in the case of an increase in its revenue (whatever the cause behind this increase, be it aid or not). For all other transition countries considered here, economic progresses leading to higher income would conversely induce more emigration. This result may however depend on the specification of our equations. Further results below suggest a much smaller threshold. Also the current context of labour mobility within the enlarged RU is to a large extent very different from relations between developed and developing countries. The EU has developed an ambitious policy of integration of its former Eastern neighbours.
Hence migrations take place in an institutional set-up in which the ultimate goal is to facilitate the freedom of movements, including of labour, with New Member countries, while very often the policy vis-à-vis non-member countries is much more restrictive.
Despite this favourable context, the freedom of labour has been neglected during the The bilateral agreements were worded in very loose terms and were not transposed into national law. For example, the German provision which regulates the work of seasonal workers and their status in Germany does not set out any specific rights or non-discrimination provisions;
As the agreements with the European Union were intended to supersede the bilateral agreements little or no effort was subsequently put into those bilateral agreements;
The quotas of nationals from the CEECs benefiting from agreements on training are not filled, principally because of the demanding criteria (for example, the requirement for proficiency in the language of the receiving state as against the low wages on offer);
The agreements have been a source of abuse by employers in some countries seeking to avoid the costs of employment.
We are now testing aggregated behaviours or potential migrants, and discussing whether European migrants behave the same as non-European migrants makes sense, notably when we discuss such effects as effects of incomes at home and of income differentials. We have tested the existence of specific behaviours of migration within Europe by introducing a dummy variable equal to 1 when the country of origin is in Central and Eastern Europe (including Cyprus and Malta, which have been included in the process of expansion of the European Union) and the country of destination is a Western EU member. A Wald test performed shows that the interaction of this vector of parameters with the European dummy variable is significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
Further scrutiny of results obtained for each variable which we interacted with the European dummy variable suggests that all of them are quite significant: the difference in GDP per capita, the GDP per capita of the East-European sending country and its squared, the distance, the language, the trade intensity variable.
Results are reported in Table 8 below. Note: ***(resp. **, *) significant at 1 percent (resp. 5 percent, 10 percent). Student-t between brackets.
Migrants from Eastern Europe are less reactive to revenue differential, but the humpshape effect is also different: its weight is higher and, more important, the threshold income for which the own income effect starts declining is lower. 5 The end result of these two shifts, according to our computations, is that the threshold income under which migration and revenue are complement falls to 2837 $US. According to 4 skilled/unskilled migration stocks and aid: complement or substitute?
We continue our analysis by addressing the question of the impact of aid on migration with respect to the level of education of migrants. The model upon which our gravity equation is based on Borjas (1989 Borjas ( , 1994 . This model assumes that the decision to migrate depends upon education and dispersion of earnings in both the source and destination countries. As a consequence, educated persons migrate to the country where return to education is the highest (1); and migrants can be less educated and earn less in both home and source countries (negative selection) if the host country taxes high income workers relatively more than the source country in order to provide better insurance for low income workers against poor labour market outcomes (2).
In compressing the earning distribution, redistribution can be expected to produce a migration pattern consisting of negatively selected individuals with below average skill levels; conversely, positive selected individuals with above average skilled levels will prefer destinations where the earning is higher (and the wealth is not as readily redistributed).
This idea is tested with two variables: the replacement rates (over 60 months of unemployment) and the Gini index in the destination countries. We expect, therefore, that unskilled migrants will prefer destinations with high replacement rates and select destinations with low Gini index 6 . The replacement rates are a proxy for redistribution policies: the higher they are, the more compressed the earnings distribution is likely to be.
Tables 9-10-11 report the result for primary, secondary, and tertiary education migrants.
Such results are based on stocks of migrants, available for one year only, due to data limitations. Nevertheless they have a lot of similarities with our previous results based on migration flows.
Distance has the same impact on the migration of all types of workers, while language is more of an impediment to migrating decision of unskilled people than of skilled people.
Interestingly, coming from a former colony is not significant for unskilled migrants, and coming from a former British, French, Spanish and Portuguese colonies seem to be more significant for unskilled workers. Moreover, skilled migrants seem to be more attracted to the western offshoots. We do not find any evidence that migrants are primarily attracted by access to welfare payments or better public services, nor do we find any evidence of a negative (positive) self-selection of unskilled (skilled) migrants more attracted towards high (low) redistributive countries. Our findings corroborate the empirical literature on this specific issue (see Kahanec, Zimmermann, 2009, page 11-12-13 ). Note: ***(resp. **, *) significant at 1 percent (resp. 5 percent, 10 percent). Student-t between brackets. Note: ***(resp. **, *) significant at 1 percent (resp. 5 percent, 10 percent). Student-t between brackets. Note: ***(resp. **, *) significant at 1 percent (resp. 5 percent, 10 percent). Student-t between brackets.
Following the approach of the previous section, we can compute the threshold for each level of education under which migration and revenue are complementary, and above which they become substitute. We find a hump-shape curve whatever the migration variable that we consider: stocks of skilled or unskilled migrants, or flows of migrants.
This similarity of results obtained with either flows or stocks deserve a particular comment. According to Lucas (2004) , the hump-shaped pattern is suspected to be a statistical artefact, due to the use of OECD data, which are stocks. Indeed OECD data are likely to overestimate migrations to industrialized countries because they fail to take into account migration flows occurring across poor (African notably) countries.
On the contrary, Lucas said, migration flows do not reveal any inversed U pattern, because they are not characterised by the same bias.
Having at our disposal both sources of data, we can check that they are consistent.
They do deliver not only the same inversed U pattern between migration and revenue, but also more or less, on average, the same threshold. Tables 10-12 indicate indeed that migration and revenue are complementary up to US$ 4384 for primary education, US$ 6367 for secondary education, and US$15085 for tertiary education, which on average are not far from the figures we obtained in the previous section using flows data.
Secondly it is important to notice that there is a range of revenues, over which skilled migrants may continue to enjoy better opportunities abroad, while unskilled individuals will have better to stay home, given the expected salary they can get on the local labour market. For any revenue in this range, an increase in GDP per capita will accentuate the brain drain phenomena by favouring the departures of skilled workers but not the departures of unskilled workers. This will happen for all East European countries and the potential or candidate countries, in as much as their GDP per capita exceeds in most cases US$ 4384 but is lower than US$ 15085 7 .
Conclusion
We have shown that foreign assistance and migration are substitute above a threshold of about 6084 $US for the entire sample; for within European migration the threshold falls to 2837 $US. This contrasting result echoes the specificities of the model of European integration process, which has emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a model which embraces many dimensions: a trade and financial dimensionenforced by the European Agreements -a strong institutional and aid dimension -the implementation of the Acquis Communautaire -the adhesion to the EU at an unprecedented speed, and finally an aid dimension -huge financial transfers embodied in the successive Phare programmes and then Structural funds.
As a result the level under which migration and economic progress are substitute turns out to be much lower within Europe. Any improvement in the economic situation translate therefore into less migration pressures, and this outcome can be highly priced for many reasons, the most important being that governments have to take into account the unpopularity of too sudden migration pressures as well as the fear (justified or not) of being invaded by workers from abroad (Shiff (2006) Our last investigation analyses the tradeoffs faced by skilled and unskilled individuals when they consider the option of migrating. A well-known stylised fact is that skilled individuals are more mobile than unskilled ones. First we provide a rationale for this higher mobility, which is that skilled individuals face lower costs, from the liquidity constraint to the linguistic and psychological components of the overall migration cost, and they anticipate higher benefits. Second we turn to the migration hump framework, and we compute three different thresholds, US$ 4384 for primary education, US$ 6367 for secondary education, and US$15085 for tertiary education.
We emphasise that for any revenue higher than US$ 4384 but lower than US$ 15085, an increase in GDP per capita accelerates the brain drain phenomena by favouring the departures of skilled workers but not the departures of unskilled workers. This negative outcome is expected to happen for most East European countries and potential or candidate countries.
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